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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE NORMAN SWAPP 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from two orders dismissing 
Plaintiff/Appellants civil actions, the second amounting to final 
judgment, entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court of 
Washington County, pursuant to motions for summary judgment. Said 
Orders are dated December 2, 1991 and January 6, 1992 respectively. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under § 78-2-2(3) (j) 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal pertaining to Defendant/Appellee 
Norman Swapp (hereinafter Swapp) is whether the lower court 
correctly granted Swapp's motion for summary judgment dismissing 
Plaintiff/Aappellant Charles B. Jackson's (hereinafter Jackson) 
Section 1983 civil rights action against Swapp on the grounds that 
§ 1983 requires the violation of federal, not state law; that the 
existence of probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to a 
§ 19 83 civil rights claim based on allegations of illegal arrest; 
and, that Swapp had probable cause for the arrest of Jackson for 
the crime of Theft of Services, § 76-6-409, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended) a class B misdemeanor. 
Summary Judgement is appropriate where there exists no 
genuine issue of material fact. Utah State Retirement Office v. 
Salt Lake County, 780 P.2d 813, 814-15 (Utah 1989). Because 
summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a 
challenge to summary judgment presents for review only questions of 
law. Transamerica Cash Reserve. Inc. v. Dixie Power, 789 P.2d 24, 
25 (Utah 1990). The trial court's legal conclusions supporting the 
grant of summary judgment must be upheld if they are correct 
conclusions of law based on the facts. Id. In making this 
determination, the trial court's conclusions are accorded no 
particular deference. Henretty v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 
(Utah 1990), citing City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement 
Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068 (Utah 1985). In considering an appeal of a grant of summary 
judgment the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most 
favorable to the appealing party and, in determining whether those 
facts require, as a matter of law, entry of judgment for the 
prevailing party, the appellate court gives no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed for 
correctness. See, Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 
634 (Utah 1989) , Barber v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 751 P.2d 
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248 (Utah App. 1988) , Geneva Pipe Company v. S & H Insurance 
Company. 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986). 
Appellant may raise on appeal, only those issues actually 
litigated in the lower court. Macaro v. Davis. 741 P.2d 938 (U*:ah 
1987) . If an issue is not raised in the moving or opposing papers, 
at the time of the hearing of the motion, or in the lower court's 
order, it is not ripe for appeal. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights privileges or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other 
proper proceeding for redress. For purposes of this 
Section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to 
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a 
statute of the District of Columbia. 
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Summary Judgment (b) For defending party. A party 
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any 
time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 21, 1992, Plaintiff/Appellant Charles B. Jackson 
filed an action against Dale Dockstader, d/b/a/ The Cliffrose Lodge 
and Gardens; the Town of Springdale; Norman Swapp; Eric Ludlow; 
Washington County; The State of Utah; and Does 1 through CC, 
alleging False Arrest; Malicious Prosecution: Allowing a Business 
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to Operate under an Improper Occupancy Permit; Abuse of Process; 
and, and violation of Plaintiff's Civil Rights in violation of the 
Civil Rights Act, Title 42, United States Code, section 1983, 
arising out Jackson's Arrest in Washington County, Utah. (Jackson's 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial pp. 4-7). 
On September 19, 1991 the parties entered into a 
stipulation agreeing to dismiss all of Jackson's claims except the 
claim of Malicious Prosecution against Dockstader and a claim of a 
§ 1983 civil rights violation against Swapp in his personal 
capacity. (ORDER OF DISMISSAL p.l). 
On November 21, 1991 a hearing was held on Swapp's Motion 
to Dismiss the § 1983 action. After reviewing all relevant 
documents in the record and hearing arguments from both counsel, 
the trial court granted Swapp's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. 
(ORDER OF DISMISSAL p.2). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For purposes of the issues raised on appeal, the 
pertinent facts are those set forth in the stipulation of facts 
entered into by Jackson and Swapp. (Amended Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Defendant Norman Swapp's Motion to 
Dismiss the § 1983 Claim - Filed November 18, 1991, STIPULATED 
FACTS pp. ii - viii). Those stipulate facts are as follows: 
1. In anticipation of an upcoming family trip, Charles B. Jackson 
made reservations for lodging at the Cliffrose Lodge, located 
in Springdale Utah, for March 24, 1989. 
2. This incident occurred during the Easter weekend, a high 
volume period for a tourist oriented business like the Lodge. 
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The Cliffrose Lodge is a small motel operation consisting of 
36 rental units. 
The office of the Cliffrose Lodge had a posted closing time of 
11:00 p.m. during the period in question. 
Jackson arrived at the Cliffrose Lodge at approximately 5:30 
p.m. on Friday, March 24, 1989 and checked into the motel, 
making payment for the room at that time by credit card. 
Jackson informed hotel staff that the room would be used by 
his son, who was probably on his way and would arrive later 
that evening. 
Jackson's notification to hotel staff that his son would come 
to the hotel desk at a later time to obtain a key to the room 
was noted and approved. 
Jackson did not notify hotel staff that his son would be 
arriving after the office's closing time. 
Jackson was never informed that the office would not be open 
and staffed all night. 
Jackson notified motel staff that his wife and his son's seven 
year old daughter, Melissa, would occupy the room until his 
son arrived. 
Jackson got up a number of times throughout the night to see 
if his son had arrived at the motel, each time with negative 
results. 
The Plaintiff's wife stayed throughout the night with Melissa, 
waiting for Melissa's fathers' arrival. The son, (Melissa's 
father), had never arrived at the motel. 
Contrary to the assurances of motel manager Dockstader, that 
there would be a key available for the son, at approximately 
9:30 a.m. Jackson was notified by his son that he had arrived 
at the Cliffrose Lodge at approximately 12:30 on Saturday 
March 25, 1989 to find that the office was closed and locked. 
Jackson's son being unable to raise any staff at the motel, 
had left and obtained lodging at the Zion Lodge. 
After learning that his son was unable to find any staff at 
12:30 a.m., Plaintiff demanded that the motel either pay for 
the room at Zion's lodge or not charge for their room where 
Jackson's wife and grandchild had stayed. 
When Jackson's demand was refused by Dockstader, Jackson 
requested the return of the charge slip that he had signed the 
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night before. When Jackson was given the slip he tore it into 
pieces and informed the motel clerk that he refused to pay for 
the room. 
Jackson left the motel and drove to the entrance of Zion's 
Park. 
At approximately 2:20 p.m. on Saturday March 25, 1989,the 
owner of the Cliffrose Motel, Dale Dockstader, reported a 
theft of services (a class B misdemeanor § 76-6-409 (3) 
U.C.A.) to the Washington County Sheriff's Office. 
Dockstader provided the Sheriff's office with a description of 
Jackson's vehicle. 
The Washington County Sheriff's office was notified that when 
Jackson had left the motel he stated that he would not be back 
in contact with the motel. 
When Jackson arrived at Zion's Park he was informed by a 
Ranger that the Cliffrose Lodge had called the park to inform 
the rangers that Jackson had left without paying for the room 
which his family had used. 
Because traffic into the park was backing up the Ranger 
processed Jackson into the Park. 
When Jackson was approached by another Ranger inside the Park 
who informed Jackson that he would be required to accompany 
the Ranger, Jackson replied that he believed the matter to be 
a civil dispute and that he had wasted enough time already and 
would not accompany the officer unless the officer provided 
him with good reason. 
When Jackson was informed that the County Sheriff's Office had 
asked the Park Rangers to arrest Jackson, Jackson explained 
what had happened on the previous night and cautioned the 
Rangers not to get involved. 
After telling Jackson they would convey his side of the story 
to the County Sheriffs office, but that they may have to 
return for him, they allowed Jackson to leave. 
Later in the day, Jackson was approached inside Zion's Park by 
deputy Norman Swapp of the Washington County Sheriff's office, 
who notified Jackson that the owner of the Cliffrose Motel had 
reported that Jackson had skipped on his motel bill. 
When deputy Swapp asked Jackson to accompany him back to the 
Motel in Springdale, Jackson informed the officer that he 
intended to go hiking with his family and would take care of 
this matter later. 
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Deputy Swapp then informed Jackson that if Jackson did not 
voluntarily go back to Springdale that the deputy would have 
to arrest Jackson, Jackson walked from the deputy towards the 
motor home. 
Jackson ultimately agreed to return to the motel to discuss 
the matter with motel manager Mr. Dockstader. Jackson asked 
his son to accompany him and deputy Swapp to Springdale, a 
request which deputy Swapp agreed to. 
Jackson, his son and deputy Swapp returned to the Cliffrose 
Lodge where Mr. Dockstader informed Jackson that if Jackson 
did not pay for the room he had registered for and used then 
as the owner and manager, he would file a criminal complaint 
against Jackson. 
Jackson informed deputy Swapp that he was not going to pay for 
the room. 
When Jackson questioned deputy Swapp about the consequences of 
the complaint, the deputy replied that if a criminal complaint 
was filed he would have to arrest Jackson. 
During this exchange the officer expressed to Jackson that the 
Easter weekend was a very busy time for the Sheriff's Office 
and that as a Deputy he would prefer that the issue be 
resolved between Jackson and the motel owner rather than 
proceeding to the arrest of Jackson. 
Jackson stated that if "working it out" required him to pay 
for something he did not feel was owing, he would not do so. 
When Jackson then stated that he would like to call his 
attorney, the deputy denied his request, stating that Jackson 
would have to come with him. 
When Jackson expressed concern about the effect that the 
ongoing action was having on his family and requested that 
deputy Swapp take them back into the Park to meet with the 
family, deputy Swapp agreed. 
While driving back into the Park, deputy Swapp told Jackson 
that he was going to arrest Jackson and transport him to St. 
George to be booked. 
When Jackson asked what the particular charges were going to 
be filed against him, the deputy replied that he did not know 
at that point in time. 
When Jackson, his son and deputy Swapp arrived at Jackson's 
motor home, Jackson asked the deputy for time to talk to his 
wife and get a sandwich, which the officer agreed to. 
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40. After Jackson informed his family that he was being arrested, 
the deputy read Jackson his Miranda rights and declined to 
allow Jackson to call his attorney at that time. Swapp 
refused to allow the Plaintiff's son to accompany them to the 
jail in St. George. During this time Swapp revealed his 
handcuffs and said to the Plaintiff, "I guess I won't have to 
use these, will I?" 
41. Jackson, without restraints was transported to the Washington 
County Jail in St. George. Plaintiff rode to St.George, Utah 
in Officer Swapp's car with an elderly couple who were 
hitchhiking a ride to an RV Park south of St. George. 
42. Deputy Swapp and Jackson arrived at the County Jail at 
approximately 6:00 p.m. and because the jail officers were 
busy, had to wait to complete the booking process. 
43. At the time, Plaintiff was arrested, there was no written 
complaint or citation from Dockstader. 
44. While waiting for completion of the booking process, Jackson 
asked deputy Swapp if he could use the telephone. Swapp 
replied that while he was unable to use the phone at that time 
he would be allowed to make a call at a later time. 
45. Jackson was informed at the jail that he would be charged with 
theft of services. 
46. Jackson was finger printed and had his picture taken as apart 
of the booking process, but was not searched. 
47. The jail officer informed Jackson that bail for theft of 
services was $150.00. When Jackson informed the officer that 
he did not have that much on him the Jail officers determined 
that he could be released on his own recognizance. 
48. At the time he was booked, charged and then released, no 
written complaint or citation had been filed. Nor was such 
filed at the time of arraignment on March 27, 1989. 
49. Charges for theft of services were filed against Jackson, but 
were later dismissed at the motion of the County Attorney's 
office. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Jackson's arguments in points I and II of his brief focus 
on his contention that the trial court was precluded from granting 
a summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact exists 
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and that Swapp's arrest of Jackson violated Jackson's federal civil 
rights. Jackson's unsubstantiated and erroneous allegations lack 
merit as well as record support, 
ARGUMENT 
Jackson argues that the lower court erred in granting 
summary judgment upon the stipulated facts. This Court has held 
that summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power 
& Water, Inc.. 789 P.2d 24,25 (Utah 1990). Therefore in 
determining whether summary judgment was properly granted this 
court must focus on whether a material issue of fact existed and if 
not whether Swapp was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO GENUINE MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT WHICH WOULD 
PRECLUDE THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
This Court has held that a genuine issue of fact only 
exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable 
minds could differ on whether the defendants conduct measures up to 
the required standard. Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126 
(1967) (as cited in Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 
1982). The lower court's decision was based on cross motions for 
summary judgment based on stipulated facts. These stipulate facts 
constitute the factual record in this case. Thus the question 
becomes whether, on the basis of the stipulated facts in the 
record, reasonable minds could have differed as to whether Swapp 
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violated Jackson's federal civil rights. If reasonable minds could 
not differ, then summary judgment was proper and must be upheld. 
Jackson contends that the lower court altered or modified 
the stipulated facts in determining when Jackson's arrest occurred. 
He claims that this modification created a material issue of fact. 
In support of this proposition he contends that the lower court 
determined that the arrest occurred in Zion's Park (fact number 28) 
rather than when Swapp and Jackson returned to the CIiffrose Motel 
(fact number 30, 32, 37) as stated in the stipulated facts. 
When an arrest occurs, generally, turns on the facts of 
the case, not the language expressing those facts. The United 
States Supreme Court has held that for Fourth Amendment purposes, 
a person is arrested when, in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed 
that he or she was not free to leave. United State v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544 (1980) . There is no requirement that the word arrest 
be used at all. Even though there is no physical restraint, 
circumstances such as the threatening presence of the officer, the 
display of a weapon by an officer, or even "the use of language or 
tone of voice indicting that compliance with the officer's request 
might be compelled" can constitute an arrest. Id at 544. 
In light of the fact that when Deputy Swapp talked to 
Jackson in Zion's Park and informed Jackson that if Jackson did not 
voluntarily go back to Springdale that the deputy would have to 
arrest Jackson, (fact number 28) the court is correct in concluding 
that Jackson would have believed that he was not free to leave and 
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that if he refused to comply with Swapp's request that he would 
have been compelled to comply. Therefore, despite the fact that 
the stipulated facts indicate that the word arrest was not used 
until Swapp and Jackson returned to the Cliffrose Motel, the court 
was correct in determining that Jackson was arrested in Zion's Park 
and that no material issue of fact exists regarding that issue. 
POINT II 
SWAPP IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff's federal civil rights claim is based upon 
alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") which provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights privileges or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other 
proper proceeding for redress. For purposes of this 
Section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to 
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a 
statute of the District of Columbia. 
In any § 1983 action, the court's initial inquiry must 
focus on whether two essential elements are present: 
(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a 
person acting under color of state law; and, 
(2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, 
privileges and immunities secured by federal law. 
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, (1981). 
In this case, there is no dispute that Deputy Norman 
Swapp was acting under color of state law when he arrested Charles 
R. Jackson on the charge of theft of services. The question 
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presented here is whether the arrest deprived the Plaintiff of any 
right, privilege, or immunity secured by federal, not state, law. 
Plaintiff claimed that his arrest was unlawful under 
applicable state law, and thus his right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures or having liberty deprived without due 
process and equal protection were violated. 
In Howlett v. Rose, 110 S.Ct. 2430 (1990), the United 
States Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he elements of, and 
defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law." 
Under federal law an officer may make a warrantless arrest if there 
is probable cause - facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant 
a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was 
committing an offense. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). . 
Section 76-6-409, Theft of Services, Utah Code Annotated 
1987, provides: 
(1) a person commits theft if he obtains services which he 
knows are available only for compensation by deception, 
threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid the 
due payment of them. 
(2) a person commits theft if, having control over the 
disposition of services of another, to which he knows he 
is not entitled, he diverts the services to his own 
benefit, or to the benefit of another who he knows is not 
entitled to them. 
(3) In this section, "services" includes, but is not limited 
to, labor, professional service, public utility and 
12 
transportation services, restaurant, hotelf motel# 
tourist cabin, rooming house or like accommodations, the 
supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers for 
temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, steam, 
admission to entertainment, exhibitions, sporting events, 
or other events for which a charge is made. 
Section 76-6-412(1) (d) , Utah Code Annotated 1977, 
provides: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable as follows: 
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was $100.00 or less. 
The stipulated facts clearly demonstrate that Deputy 
Swapp had reasonable cause to believe that a criminal offense had 
been or was being committed. The Plaintiff rented a motel room and 
members of his family used the motel room. When a dispute over 
whether any payment was owing arose between Charles Jackson and 
Dale Dockstader, Jackson ripped up the motel's credit card receipt 
evidencing Jackson's agreement to pay for the room, informed the 
motel clerk that he refused to pay for the room and then left the 
vicinity without paying for the motel room. 
A reasonable police officer would believe that the 
conduct of the Plaintiff in using and then not paying for the use 
of the room constituted the crime of theft of services within the 
meaning of Section 76-6-409, Utah Code Annotated 1987, and would 
believe that the Plaintiff both attempted to destroy the written 
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evidence of the service that was provided and attempted to flee the 
area to avoid his arrest. 
Jackson argues that Swapp did not have probable cause to 
arrest Jackson because he did not have an arrest warrant and "knew 
or should have known that the alleged crime was a misdemeanor" 
(Jackson's Appellant Brief, page 16 paragraph 2). 
All that the federal constitutional law requires is that 
the arresting officer have probable cause to believe that some 
offense has been committed. Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770 (9th 
Cir. 1990)(requirement that a misdemeanor must be committed in an 
officer's presence is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment). The 
stipulated facts on record underlying the lower court's decision 
show facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man 
in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an 
offense. Therefore the fact that Jackson had allegedly committed 
only a misdemeanor does not negate the validity of his arrest and 
does not constitute a violation of his federal civil rights. 
Plaintiff's second basis for claiming that his arrest was 
not lawful appears to be the principle that "evidence which 
establishes no more than a breach of an express or implied contract 
is a purely civil matter and is insufficient to prove theft of 
services". The fact that Plaintiff was able to get the prosecutor 
to drop criminal charges based upon that principle does not mean 
that Deputy Swapp should be held liable for unlawful arrest where 
Swapp had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff committed a 
crime. The evidence in this case shows that the Plaintiff not only 
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violated an express or implied contract but attempted to destroy 
the documentary evidence of that agreement and fled the vicinity to 
avoid being arrested for that conduct. That the Plaintiff thought 
that he was justified in doing so, does not negate the fact that a 
reasonable police officer could have believed probable cause 
existed that Plaintiff committed the crime of theft of services and 
that Plaintiff was subject to a warrantless arrest under federal 
standards, 
POINT III 
SWAPP DID NOT ATTEMPT TO COMPEL JACKSON TO NEGOTIATE 
A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE WITH DOCKSTADER 
UNDER THE THREAT OF ARREST. 
Jackson has alleged that Swapp had no authority to 
attempt or arrange civil resolution of the dispute between Jackson 
and Dockstader and violated Jackson's civil right to due process 
and equal protection by compelling him to negotiate settlement of 
the dispute under threat of arrest. 
To prevail on an alleged violation of equal protection, 
plaintiff must present facts showing that he was subjected to 
discriminatory treatment not rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 487 U.S. 
450, 457-58 (1988); Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th 
Cir. 1988). Strict scrutiny will not be invoked unless the 
challenged government action discriminates against a suspect class 
or interferes with a fundamental right. 
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Jackson has not marshalled facts showing that he is a 
member of a suspect class. Jackson has also not shown that Swapp's 
statement to Jackson that the "Easter weekend was a very busy time 
for the Sheriff's Office and that as a Deputy he would prefer that 
the issue be resolved between Jackson and the motel owner rather 
than proceeding to the arrest of Jackson" (STATEMENT OF THE FACTS, 
number 33) was an attempt to compel Jackson to negotiate settlement 
of the dispute with Dockstader, under threat of arrest. Jackson 
has also failed to show that Swapp's statement interfered with 
Jackson's fundamental rights. 
The stipulated facts contained in the record indicate 
that Swapp did not threaten to initiate criminal proceedings 
against Jackson if he failed to satisfy a civil debt. Rather the 
facts support the lower courts decision that Swapp had probable 
cause to arrest Jackson for theft of services, and that he did 
everything in his power to treat Jackson reasonably and tried to 
avoid arresting Jackson if at all possible. (Order of Dismissal, 
page 2, paragraph 2). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial 
court granting defendant/appellee Swapp's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of September, 1992. 
Lynn L 
Attord 
Appellee NormasrSwapp 
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DEPU" 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES B. JACKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE DOCKSTADER, d/b/a THE 
CLIFFROSE LODGE AND GARDENS; 
THE TOWN OF SPRINGDALE; 
NORMAN SWAPP; ERIC LUDLOW; 
WASHINGTON COUNTY; THE STATE 
OF UTAH; AND DOES I THROUGH CC, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil NO. 910500135 CV 
This matter came regularly before the court on the Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss filed August 15, 1991. 
On August 28, 1991, Plaintiff filed Objection and supporting 
memorandum and affidavit. On September 14, 1991, the Defendants' 
filed a Reply Memorandum. On September 19, 1991, at the hearing 
set for that motion, counsel for the parties announced that they 
had agreed to meet to discuss settlement. The meetings that were 
held thereafter resulted in a stipulation agreeing to dismiss all 
claims against all parties except: (1) the claims brought against 
Dale Dockstader d/b/a Cliffrose Lodge, and (2) THE § 1983 ACTION 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION BROUGHT AGAINST DEPUTY SWAPP IN HIS PERSONAL 
CAPACITY. Defendant counsel agreed not to seek attorney's fees. 
Another hearing was set for November 21, 1991 and Defendant 
Swapp filed an amended memorandum focusing on the issues presented 
by the § 1983 claim against Deputy Swapp in his personal capacity• 
At the November 21, 1991 hearing on the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss the § 1983 civil rights action against Deputy Swapp in his 
personal capacity, the Court after reviewing all relevant documents 
in the record, heard the arguments of both counsel in the premises, 
and found: (1) Section 1983 requires the violation of federal, not 
state law; (2) existence of probable cause to arrest is an absolute 
defense to the § 1983 civil rights claim based upon a false arrest; 
(3) Washington County Deputy Sheriff Swapp, had probable cause for 
the arrest of Charles B. Jackson, Plaintiff herein, for the crime 
of theft of services, § 76-6-409, a class B misdemeanor; (4) Even 
if Deputy Swapp had lacked sufficient probable cause to make that 
arrest, his reasonable belief that probable cause existed based on 
the facts and circumstances he was aware of would have justified a 
grant of qualified immunity in this case; and (5) Deputy Swapp did 
everything in his power to treat Charles B. Jackson reasonably and 
tried to avoid arresting Mr. Jackson, if possible. 
THEREFORE, good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Deputy Norman Swapp's 
Motion to dismiss the § 1983 civil rights action against Swapp in 
his personal capacity is granted; Plaintiff Jackson's Complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice as against Deputy Swapp, having already 
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been dismissed as against all other named Defendants except Dale 
Dockstader d/b/a Cliffrose Lodge, Each party is responsible for 
his own costs, attorney's fees and interest-
Dated this $-?£- day of ^JL^^J^ 1991, 
BY THE COURT: 
^ ^ ^ . " ^ ^ -
A / Philip E^es 
District Cou; urt Judge 
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